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INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: EXPLORING LOCAL PERSPECTIVES AND MECHANISMS FOR DEALING WITH COMMUNITY FORESTRY DISPUTES

by
Alfonso Peter Castro, Kreg Ettenger
Anthropology Department
Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York, USA 13244

Paper Prepared for the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Community Forestry Unit, for the Global Electronic Conference on "Addressing Natural Resource Conflicts Through Community Forestry," January-April 1996

SUMMARY

This paper analyzes the interface between indigenous knowledge and conflict management in community forestry. Indigenous knowledge is portrayed as a repertoire of ideas and actions from which community members faced with specific problems can draw, depending on their level of knowledge, their preferences, and their ability and motivation to act. Thus, it involves improvisation and flexibility in response to ongoing conditions. Dispute processing is similarly characterized as a repertoire of processes which communities and their members respond to dynamically and differentially.

Communities often not only have their own customary legal orders, but also have access to state or other legal systems. While communities may be able to appeal to different legal orders, not all people have equal access to all options. In general, all legal orders rely, to varying extents, on the same basic procedural modes to handle disputes (including those involving community forestry): avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. These processes are examined in detail, including issues of accessibility and equity.

The paper presents four case studies which explore the role and relevance of dispute processing for community forestry. The first case is a historical study of conflicts associated with Njukiine forest in Kenya. It reveals the dynamic, embedded, and protracted nature of disputes, as well as the importance of power differences in their "resolution". Dispute resolution through the articulation of Cree indigenous resource management practice with governmental agencies in Quebec, Canada, is examined in the second study. The strengthening and modifying of the "tallyman" system in the wake of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement is highlighted. Environmental mediation in Indonesia joint forest management in India are compared to illuminate the differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches in incorporating indigenous knowledge into dispute processing. The paper concludes with questions for follow-up discussion.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Working Assumptions

2. INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

3. LOCAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

3.1. Negotiation

3.1.1. Advantages and Limitations of Negotiation

3.1.2. Selecting an Arena

3.1.3. Supporters and Bargaining

3.1.4. Reaching Acceptable Decisions

3.2. Mediation

3.2.1. Role and Characteristics of Mediators

3.3. Arbitration

3.3.1. Arbitration Forums

3.3.2. Arbitrators

3.4. Adjudication and Communities

3.4.1. Courts and Social Change

3.4.2. Barriers to Adjudication

4. CASE STUDIES

4.1. A History of Forest Conflict and Negotiation in Kenya

4.1.1. Infra-Community and Inter-Community Disputes

4.1.2. A Local-State Dispute and "Resolution"

4.1.3. Renegotiation

4.1.4. Analysis

4.2. Articulating Local Knowledge In State Structures: The Cree of Quebec

4.2.1. Cultural Values and Traditional Resource Management

4.2.2. Formalizing Local Systems of Conflict Resolution

4.2.3. Regional Models for Collaborative Conflict Resolution

4.3. Government Intervention vs. Community Interaction: Indonesia and India

4.3.1. Environmental Mediation in Indonesia

4.3.2. Joint Forest Management in India

5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1. Questions for Further Discussion

6. REFERENCE

1. INTRODUCTION

Indigenous knowledge (IK) has been examined in various contexts, especially in terms of development planning, but there has been little published to date regarding how IK can help solve problems once they arise. And while there is a rapidly growing body of literature on conflict management, particularly with respect to consensus-buildings methods such as negotiation and mediation, there is little on the role of local or "indigenous" mechanisms for solving disputes. This paper examines the interface between indigenous knowledge and conflict management, particularly the relevance of local dispute-resolution mechanisms for community forestry.

First we present some "working assumptions" about communities and conflict which help frame our discussion of the role of IK. Next we discuss the concept of indigenous knowledge and its applications. We then present examples of how local institutions and processes are used to resolve and manage disputes related to forest resources. In addition to published studies, we draw upon our own field experiences related to community forestry and conflict in Kenya, Bangladesh and Northern Canada. Finally, we offer our views on the usefulness of local mechanisms for handling community forestry and related disputes.

Geographically and thematically, we have likely missed large areas germane to this subject. Already participants in this conference have shared examples of local conflict management practices and their application to community forestry. We welcome and expect, as part of the discussion this paper is intended to generate, further examples of locally-based dispute resolution practices related to forest management from all parts of the globe.

1.1. Working Assumptions

Before proceeding we would like to offer some premises, derived from our own experiences and published studies, that underlie our discussion.

1.1.1. Conflict exists to some degree in every community. The form and intensity of conflicts vary widely by place, and over time within each community. The ways in which communities and their members respond to conflicts also vary considerably. Significant diversity often exists within communities in terms of knowledge, opinion, material wealth, power, and status. Therefore, conflicts and the way they are handled should be examined from a social and historical perspective, with an understanding and appreciation of the range of local viewpoints.

1.1.2. A dispute is a public acknowledgement of conflict between two parties. It signifies severe disagreement, but also a willingness to do something about the claim. Not all conflicts become disputes. People often allow grievances to smoulder because of fear, distrust, peer pressure, financial constraints, exclusion from certain disputing procedures, or strategic reasons. Some societies encourage their members to avoid public confrontations. An apparent lack of disputes, however, does not means that conflict is somehow absent.

1.1.3. Disputes are often entangled in complex conflicts between individual community members, families, and various other social groups. A seemingly minor dispute may have major implications because of socio-economic, political, or cultural conflicts embedded in it. The task of sorting out such conflicts for the purpose of resolving immediate disputes can be time-consuming and difficult, or even impossible. A seemingly resolved dispute may resurface long afterwards because the underlying conflict remains. At the same time, the web of social relations within a community often compels parties in a dispute to work towards a solution, especially when pressured to do so by family members, neighbours, community leaders, or government authorities.

1.1.4. All communities possess ways of resolving or managing disputes. These mechanisms may be formal or informal, violent or peaceful, equitable or not. While specific mechanisms vary, communities rely to varying extents on the same basic procedural modes to handle disputes: avoidance, coercion, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication (Nader and Todd 1978; Pendzich et al. 1994). These processes will be defined and analysed in the course of this paper.

1.1.5. Community members involved in disputes take courses of action based on their preferences, their knowledge about the options available to them, their perceived likelihood of success, and their relationship with an opponent. Not all people have equal access to all options; class, gender, age, and other factors may restrict which avenues are open to certain individuals or groups. Seasonality, through its influence on labour patterns, income flow, and so on, can affect the ability of people to act on disputes. Finally, the nature of the dispute itself may prescribe the use of certain legal procedures.

1.1.6. Most communities have long histories of contact with their neighbours, as well as with state-level and other institutions, which have significantly affected the way that they perceive and manage conflicts. The existence of different bodies of laws and legal procedures within the same socio-political space is called legal pluralism. Communities are sometimes able to appeal to legal orders rooted in the nation-state, religion, ethnic group, caste, local custom, or other entity. These legal orders are not discrete or closed systems but overlap. They can be complementary or competitive and contradictory. In particular, nation-states attempt to exercise exclusive control over the definition of legal, extra-legal and illegal orders. Community members, however, hold their own views of legitimate and illegitimate authority.

1.1.7. Community forestry disputes are largely handled through legal forums and procedures used for dealing with other land-based issues. Shepherd (1992:11) points out regarding Africa's dry forests: "By and large, the tenure and authority regimes which once governed the successful use of forest, have also been those that govern the use of farmland and all other natural resources." This statement probably applies to many other regions of the world as well. Government agencies, particularly Forest Departments, are a notable exception. These specialized agencies often possess their own judicial mechanisms, complete with guards and officers capable of rendering instant justice by "compounding" offences (setting on-the-spot fines).

1.1.8. In many places the nature and intensity of conflicts, as well as structures for their resolution, have changed due to increasing connections with outside social and economic forces, as well as internal pressures. Some local systems appear unable to respond effectively to the type or scale of conflict now being seen. Yet, many customary procedures remain. In some places it is the official system of authority which appears overwhelmed and threatened. There is a danger in applying an essentially "traditional" versus "modern" dichotomy, since it is likely to underestimate the adaptability and resilience of local practices, while overstating the capacity of official institutions and vice versa.

2. INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE

The term "indigenous knowledge" generally refers to how members of a community perceive and understand their environment and resources, particularly the way they convert those resources through labor. (Our use of this term follows convention, but as DeWalt [1994] notes, the term "local knowledge" might be more accurate; also see Brush [1993] for elaboration of the distinctions.) According to Kloppenburg (1991:528), IK is "shaped and delimited by the distinctive characteristics of a particular place," which opposes it to western science with its emphasis on finding universal principles. Theoretically, since every population is unique in terms of its environment, its resources, and its tools (both physical and conceptual), the indigenous knowledge that group possesses will also be unique. This applies whether the community relies mainly on farming, fishing, foraging, or some other means of subsistence.

While in theory the term indigenous knowledge could be applied to nearly any population, its usage is normally limited by at least two factors. First, it is usually assumed that 1'K refers to the product of a long (often several generations or more) process of adaptation to a particular environment, with learning based on experience and experimentation. Second, it applies best to small, relatively homogeneous groups, where most members of the community (however that is defined) possess a similar range and depth of knowledge, at least with respect to a particular topic (farming, for example). Of course, there are exceptions to this rule: some community members have more knowledge than others, and often there are locally acknowledged "experts"; some fields (like medicine) lend themselves more readily to specialization; and certain knowledge may be inaccessible to the lay person, being reserved for members of guilds or other exclusive groups. The idea of indigenous knowledge presumes, however, that within each community there exists a corpus of knowledge and beliefs shared to a large extent by most, if not all, community members. This "common wisdom" allows communities to function on a daily basis and to respond to special circumstances like resource conflicts in ways that preserve community stability.

Indigenous knowledge has been shown to have applications in many areas, including development planning, environmental assessment, agriculture, resource management, and local conservation of biological resources. Many authors see indigenous knowledge as offering an alternative perspective and combination of local wisdom and practical experience that competes with (and in some cases outperforms) or enhances the models offered by "western science." Others question, however, the distinction between these alternative paradigms, arguing for example that "the same knowledge can be classified one way or the other depending on the interests it serves, the purposes for which it is harnessed, or the manner in which it is generated" (Agrawal 1995:433). Some even feel that the study of local knowledge "is a political and literary undertaking" rather than a scientific one, and suggest that "enshrining local knowledge as more than just a complement to Cartesian science will not be a productive agenda" for those seeking solutions to real-world problems (Molnar et al. 1992:89-90). We prefer to take the middle road espoused by authors like DeWalt (1994:127), who suggests "that we see indigenous knowledge systems and scientific knowledge systems as complementary sources of wisdom."

While we support the general idea that local people possess a great store of knowledge which they can draw upon to manage their environments, often with great success, we agree with Richards (1993) that such knowledge should not be seen as an unchanging set of rules for conduct. Using the example of a farmer responding to drought by planting successive crops as conditions warrant, Richards explains that what may eventually look like a well-planned multi-cropping pattern is actually "the product of a set of . improvisational capacities called forth by the needs- of the moment" (1993: 62). We feel it is critical to keep this point in mind when thinking about conflict resolution as well. Indigenous knowledge-whether about farming or settling disputes--does not provide a set formula for community decision-making. It is simply a repertoire of ideas and actions from which individuals and communities faced with specific problems can draw, depending on their own level of knowledge, their preferences, and their ability and motivation to act.

3. LOCAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In this section we use examples from the literature to illustrate the range of local dispute resolution mechanisms and identify some potentials and limitations of such mechanisms for handling forestry conflicts. We focus on four methods of dispute processing: negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and adjudication. These four divisions are artificial to some extent, since in practice they often show considerable overlap. It bears mentioning also that people use other mechanisms for handling disputes at the local level, including peer pressure, gossip, ostracism, violence, public humiliation, witchcraft, spiritual healing, and the fissioning of kin or residential groups.

It also should be emphasized that local dispute decisions are not predetermined by precedence in customary law. Moore (1986: 38) warns about the fallacy that indigenous peoples "are somehow more rigid about their oral rules than post-industrial ones are about their written legal codes." All legal systems include some element of negotiability and discretionary arrangement. While local values and legal norms influence the dispute resolution process, however, it can be difficult to identify their particular relevance in a specific settlement.

3.1. Negotiation

The process of negotiation is one of the most common forms of local-level dispute resolution, in part because it usually costs less than other methods, but also because it allows disputants to work out their own resolutions, often leading to more satisfying and enforceable settlements. The disputants seek to move beyond their impasse through discussion and persuasion, culminating in a collaborative decision. As Gulliver (1979:5) points out, however, "Each party can only obtain what the other is in the end prepared to allow." Negotiation may be combined with other techniques, including mediation, conciliation, and arbitration (these will be discussed below). It also often includes elements of ritual (ceremonies and appeals to divine justice) and theatre (dramatic rhetoric and unfolding suspense as the case plays itself out.

3.1.1. Advantages and Limitations of Negotiation

Negotiation offers several advantages: it is relatively inexpensive; allows much flexibility in scheduling and procedures; respects local values and customs; encourages participation by community members; and involves collaborative decision-making by the disputants. Consensus emerges from wide-ranging discussion, often fostering reconciliation among disputants.

Negotiation seems to be most useful in intra-group disputes, where members are knowledgeable and trustful of one another. Such groups also can exert peer pressure or other sanctions to enforce the settlement. It is difficult to carry out where significant social or geographical distances separate the disputants. People from outside the community, or with few kinfolk, often encounter difficulties arranging a forum, presenting a case, or ensuring enforcement. The Arusha of Tanzania have responded to such constraints by adopting government courts to handle disputes between strangers, while retaining negotiations for lineage and age-set affairs (Colson 1974).

The general steps in the negotiation process are outlined here.

3.1.2. Selecting an Arena

The initial step in negotiation usually involves agreement on an appropriate arena for airing the dispute. Cultural norms often dictate that a certain forum be used for negotiating particular conflicts. Brothers contesting ownership of a small plot of trees in Kirinyaga, Kenya, for instance, are expected to seek resolution through an informal meeting of kinsmen.

Sometimes informal leaders or local authorities decide on the arena to be used. Hamlet leaders in northern India, for instance, may call either a formal or informal community meeting to resolve disputes, especially those related to land (Cohn 1967). Where disputants have a choice of forums, however, they are likely to seek the arena they believe holds the most advantage for their side.

Negotiations sometimes occur in intentional but informal public meetings such as the "moots" among the Gwembe Tonga in Zambia (Colson 1995) and Ndendeuli in Tanzania (Gulliver 1971), or the informal panchayats in northern India (Moore 1993, Wadley 1994). These quasi-legal or extra-legal forums are composed of kinfolk and neighbours, summoned as the need arises. The legitimacy of the meetings derives from the moral authority of the community and its members.

Local socio-cultural and political institutions can also serve as a framework for dispute processing. Kinship groups, neighbourhood or village councils, age-sets or generation-sets (organized groups of men or women of similar ages), religious groups, ethnic and caste associations, work-related groups, and local authorities provide formal or informal forums for negotiation by their members. Disputes may be handled by these groups in the course of general-purpose meetings, in specially convened public moots, or in limited-access conclaves. Chagga communities in rural Tanzania, for example, use informal kin and neighbourhood moots, church leaders, and local authorities for negotiations (Moore 1986).

3.1.3. Supporters and Bargaining

Each party recruits kinfolk and neighbours to assist in the negotiations. The purpose of this is twofold: to build a stronger case for oneself, and to improve the chances for a settlement by including skilled negotiators in the process. The need to attract and maintain supporters often compels a disputant to pursue only pressing issues, since kinfolk and neighbours may not show up for matters they regard as trivial. The credibility of a case can be undermined before negotiations begin if a disputant fails to attract sufficient allies. Disputants seek gifted orators, skilled inquisitors, and wise advisors to build a convincing case. Many societies encourage disputants to pick spokesmen known to be capable of negotiating in a detached manner. Among peoples as diverse as rural Javanese, the Gwembe Tonga, and Australian aboriginal populations, the expectation is that voices of experience and detachment, rather than anger, should guide the proceedings (Moore and Santosa 1995; Colson 1995; Ross 1995).

Bargaining procedures vary widely. Accounts often depict a slow, meandering, sometimes orderly, sometimes anarchic flow of argument. In some places discussions are limited to key speakers or elders, while in other places everyone is entitled to have a say. These deliberations commonly include an assessment of the disputants, the case, and its possible wider significance. Cohn (1967: 148) also notes that in northern India, "talking seems to relieve some of the aggression built up in the dispute." Underlying the process is the extensive knowledge of the participants regarding the parties and issues at hand. This intimate knowledge proves invaluable in building trust and suggesting solutions.

3.1.4. Reaching Acceptable Decisions

Ideally in negotiations, persuasive arguments and peer pressure will narrow differences, and the contesting parties gradually reach an agreement through consensus. As will be discussed below, mediators frequently play a major role in gaining concessions and building consensus. Reaching "closure" usually involves not only settling the original point of contention, but other disputes which emerge during bargaining. In many places the settlement receives ritual or social affirmation by prayer, ceremonies, oaths, embracing, feasting, gift-giving, or other means.

The joint decision-making of negotiation does not necessarily produce more harmonious or longer lasting settlements than other conflict-resolution mechanisms (Colson 1995). Nor does it assure equitable or balanced solutions. In informal panchayats of Karimpur, India, "Often the result is not 'fair' but instead supports the group able to wield the most power" (Wadley 1994: 192). There are many reasons why people will accept unfavourable decisions: their case, or its public support, is weak; they need to maintain ongoing social relations; peer pressure compels them to do so; they fear the dispute may escalate; or they plan to appeal to another forum.

There is usually no formal means to ensure compliance with a decision, and enforcement can be especially difficult if significant social or geographical distance separates the disputants. Community members often use a variety of measures to encourage compliance: persuasion, peer pressure, withdrawal of aid, social ostracism, and threats of escalating the dispute. Lawsuits may also be threatened. Arbitration and adjudication pose risks, since each party may end up with a decision that is less advantageous than one reached voluntarily.

3.2. Mediation

Negotiations often involve the use of mediators, individuals who help disputing parties reach a decision. Mediators by definition lack the authority to impose a settlement. Yet, when effective, they can considerably influence the negotiating process. Their goal is to foster an ongoing exchange of views so that a dialogue of compromise may emerge (Gulliver 1979). Amediator may be selected ahead of time by the disputants, but in other cases individuals emerge in that role in the course of negotiations. Being a mediator offers diverse rewards: enhanced prestige; confirmation of local leadership; the ability to build a clientele; and sometimes payment for services rendered.

3.2.1. Role and Characteristics of Mediators

According to some definitions, a mediator is supposed to be a neutral third party, but in many small communities such a status is impossible. The shared social ties between the mediator and disputants, however, can actually foster the negotiating process. Among the Ndendeuli, for example, a local notable engaged in brokering disputes will play on his links with each party as a demonstration of good will to both (Gulliver 1971). What is crucial is the mediator's ability to persuade both parties to find a mutually acceptable solution. The mediator's role often involves conciliation, communicating separately with the disputing parties to foster the process of compromise. During negotiations in hamlet meetings in northern India, for example, local lineage leaders constantly take aside contending parties, urging them to modify their demands (Cohn 1967).

Among the Gikuyu, mediators are often elderly males who have distinguished themselves through skillful argument and wise decisions in past litigation. They are generally prosperous, generous, engaged in local political and religious affairs, and, nowadays, literate. Zapotec villagers in Mexico sometimes use priests, older family members, or ritual kinfolk (compadres) as mediators (Nader 1990). Traditional Ndendeuli mediators are also informal leaders or 'notables" with demonstrated skills in negotiations and other personal achievements. Such iindividuals seek prestige and influence, but within community-defined limits. Gulliver (1971: 66) records: "Foolishly over-ambitious notables endangered the very influence they had achieved."

Northern Somali society has a tradition of both religious and secular mediators. A wadaad is an Islamic religious authority responsible for directing Friday prayers, leading religious feasts, and other spiritual duties. The wadaad is not supposed to engage in lineage politics. However, the wadaad often serves as a mediator, bringing together rival groups. He has no ritual sanction, nor any temporal powers, but only a serious determination to "mediate between man and man, and between man and God" (Lewis 1961:217). Secular mediators include sultans, who are kin-group leaders, as well as notable elders who have distinguished themselves in prior negotiations.

3.3. Arbitration

The process of arbitration involves submitting a dispute to a mutually agreeable third party, who renders an advisory or binding decision. In practice, the distinction between mediation and arbitration can be quite fuzzy. Indigenous peoples and rural communities generally use a bargaining model based on collaboration, consensus building, and mutual agreement for both processes (Nader 1990). The boundary is also often unclear between arbitration and adjudication, the latter process being based on decision-making by a judge or an administrative officer. The distinction between the two is especially problematic given the incorporation of some local-level arbitration forums into state legal systems. Collaborative procedures have long been a part of rural arbitration forums in Indonesia, for example, rooted in the country's precolonial kingdoms, sultanates, and village law (Moore and Santosa 1995).

3.3.1. Arbitration Forums

Many indigenous arbitration forums closely resemble the moots that handle negotiations. The Kpelle of Liberia, for example, use an informal meeting that is very similar in structure and process to the assemblies used by the Gwembe Tonga and Ndendeuli (Gibbs 1967). But the Kpelle moot has the moral authority to impose a decision if the disputants cannot reach a settlement. Its decision is shaped by the give-and-take of bargaining and a desire to compromise.

The Talea Zapotec town courts of Oaxaca, Mexico, are an example of a formal arbitration body (Nader 1990). The courts arose hundreds of years ago during the Spanish colonial era. They now form part of the Mexican government's judicial system, responsible to district magistrates, but are given considerable flexibility in their operation. The courts are characterized by open access and widespread local participation. Diverse sectors of the community use them on a regular basis, including women (who file half of the cases), the poor, and the landless. In general, these forums promote reconciliation through compromise. The elected but unpaid justices decide cases "without written law, resolving conflict by minimizing the sense of injustice and outrage felt by the parties of a case" (Nader 1990:121).

National governments sometimes co-opt or set up their own community-level arbitration forums. The intent is partly to increase local access to dispute processing, enabling people to avoid expensive and onerous litigation in the courts. Under the guise of decentralization, the policy also extends state control over local dispute resolution. The salish in Bangladesh (Adnan 1990) and the gram panchayat in India (Moore 1993) are indigenous forums incorporated into the state system. These state-sanctioned arbitration agencies have a very mixed record. Both the salish and the gram panchayat tend to be dominated by the local power structure, favoring the wealthy and the politically connected and excluding the interests of women and the poor.

3.3.2. Arbitrators

Indigenous arbitrators share many of the characteristics of mediators. They tend to be prosperous male elders, often renowned for their speaking skills and sound judgement. In many cases they possess formal or informal leadership positions. Kpelle arbitrators, for example, commonly hold such influential roles as town chief or quarter elder (Gibbs 1967). In northern Somalia, the clan and sub-clan sultans often serve as mediators and arbitrators. The sultans' process of arriving at a decision is often collaborative, allowing the disputants an active role in shaping a compromise. Indeed, to be heavy-handed undermines a sultan's authority, as expressed in a Somali proverb: "Three things bring the down of Sultans; biased judgement (in the settlement of disputes), dryhandedness (meanness) and indecision" (Lewis 1961: 205).

Increasingly, people who hold formal arbitration positions require skills such as knowledge of the official language, literacy, book-keeping, and the ability to navigate in wider administrative and legal settings. In some places, such as among pastoralists in Mali, tensions arise between customary leaders who lack such skills and younger men with such capabilities (Vedeld 1994). Access to political authorities at the regional and national level is also crucial. The members of the Tanzanian land tribunals, for example, are appointed by the central government, and one of its five members must be a lawyer (Moore 1986). Local politics still matter, too. The arbitration tribunal members in Tanzania are selected by the local branch of the ruling political party (Moore 1986). In Bangladesh communities, there is often considerable overlap between individuals holding "economic, social and juridical positions of power" at the village level (Adnan 1990: 177).

3.4. Adjudication and Communities

Decision-making in adjudication is vested in judges and administrators, who possess the authority to impose a settlement on disputants. It is sometimes depicted as the antithesis of negotiation. According to Gulliver (1979), adjudication is more likely to apply legal norms in a rigid manner, to offer all-or-nothing decisions, to be expensive, and to show little concern about the complexities of local relationships. There are many issues about the accessibility and appropriateness of adjudication for processing disputes in small communities, as will be discussed below.

3.4.1. Courts and Social Change

When offered a choice between local negotiation or relying on courts, people often strongly, even passionately, pick the former (Gulliver 1971). In many places, however, people rely on courts and administrators as dispute-resolution forums. This situation occurs to a large extent because indigenous practices were supplanted or undermined by colonial and post-colonial regimes. But courts have also proven popular to some people in certain settings. The right of equal treatment under the law, for example, extends legal protections to "strangers" not covered by customary law.

The Gwembe Tonga increasingly prefer to submit disputes through local courts instead of neighbourhood moots. This change in their legal procedures reflects new social and . political realities: growing individualism in matters regarding property; rejection of illiterate elders by schooled young people; and a desire to challenge opponents in matters once regarded as too trivial for local moots. Filing a case with the village court is not expensive, and it bestows to Gwembe Tonga villagers the satisfaction of seeing one's opponent compelled to answer a complaint (Colson 1995).

Enforcement of legal standards on the basis of individual rights sometimes provides people with new opportunities for mobility and advancement. Examples include the assertion of land rights by indigenous peoples, supported by outside lawyers and others. Several communities in the Cordillera Region of the Philippines, for example, recently employed national and international law in defense of their land claims, with some success (Frill-Brett 1994). Rubber tappers in western Brazil combined social mobilization, political action, and litigation' in government courts in their struggle to establish the Alto Jurua Extractive Reserve. Realizing that local courts were dominated by hostile business interests, the tappers and their supporters transferred the case to federal jurisdiction. This action allowed the case to be heard in a less biased setting, greatly reducing the political clout of the local elite (de Almeida 1993).

Of course the use of courts by no means ensures the protection of indigenous rights. Biased justices and laws, the high cost of litigation, logistical difficulties in carrying out courts cases, unfamiliarity with the state legal system, and related reasons make it difficult for rural communities to pursue litigation. National governments can be formidable opponents or very ambivalent allies. Nevertheless, in some circumstances national and international courts may offer indigenous peoples a level playing field in which to compete.

3.4.2. Barriers to Adjudication

In many places, however, adjudication is seen by villagers, especially women and the poor, as hostile. Bangladesh offers a case study. The widespread control of the local level salish by the elite is only the first barrier in the judicial process. The state courts\ are also dominated by the economic and political elite (BRAC 1990). The implications for community forestry were clearly evident in interviews conducted in 1992. There have been numerous disputes over rights to forest land, including litigation between rural people, the Forest Department, and the Revenue Department (Khan et al. 1991).

Villagers often expressed skepticism about ever settling their claims in court, particularly in a timely and inexpensive manner (Castro et al. 1992:16). The same reasoning led some of them to abandon struggles against local elites who cleared trees from the villagers' land.

4. CASE STUDIES

As outlined above, indigenous peoples generally use a range of forums and processes for handling disputes. Many of these practices have been quite effective, durable, and adaptable in meeting the needs of their communities. There is no doubt much to be learned about dispute resolution in community forestry from a closer look at these local-level techniques. The following case studies were chosen to illustrate in particular (and in order) (1) the historical complexity of local forest conflicts; (2) the articulation of local-level systems in state-level institutions; and (3) the transfer of knowledge about conflict resolution between communities, and from state-level agencies to local populations.

4.1. A History of Forest Conflict and Negotiation in Kenya

This section presents a case study of dispute resolution associated with Njukiine forest, which nowadays covers about 1,000 hectares in central Kenya. An in-depth examination reveals the embedded nature of forest conflicts, as well as the strategies and processes used by different actors or stakeholders. The case study also illustrates the need to look at forest conflicts from a historical perspective which takes into account the range of local forest users. It is based on fieldwork by Castro (1995).

4.1.1. Infra-Community and Inter-Community Disputes

In the precolonial era Njukiine forest in central Kenya was a common property resource managed by local Gichugu Gikuyu and Embu elders. Lineages held land rights, and restrictions on clearing were enforced through neighbourhood consensus. Following the British conquest in 1904, the colonial regime quickly seized control over the large Mount Kenya forest, but it left the much smaller Njukiine forest in local hands. Beginning in the 1920s Gikuyu from neighbouring districts, the victims of colonial land appropriation, moved into the area. The early newcomers often reached agreements with local lineages, who sanctioned clearing in return for ritual recognition of their kin group's land rights. Immigration accelerated, with outsiders now joined by some local people. These newcomers often treated Njukiine as an open-access resource. Lineage elders grew angry as newcomers claimed ownership through first clearance. Numerous disputes arose.

The lineage-based moot proved unsuitable as a dispute arena because newcomers refused to acknowledge its legitimacy. Appeals were made to the area's government-appointed chiefs, but they often had conflicts of interest because they had favored immigration as a means of increasingly their constituencies. Litigation was submitted to the state's Gichugu tribunal, but the issue was diverted to the local native council, a colonial legislative body composed of elected and appointed men from the district. A British officer, the district commissioner, served as the president, convening meetings on a quarterly basis. Neither the newcomers nor women were represented. The council was empowered to act in land and forestry issues, though its members were cautious in such matters. They ruled in 1934, however, that the area belonged to the lineages. Yet competition for land continued, and a new stakeholder group emerged: companies of immigrant Gikuyu pitsawyers who penetrated the forest interior.

4.1.2. A Local-State Dispute and "Resolution"

This time it was the British administration that protested, claiming that forest clearing caused land degradation. But some colonial officials had another agenda: placing Njukiine under Forest Department management. Plans for the agency to take over locally important forest were discussed as early as 1929. The government had the authority to appropriate the land, but political realities now made unilateral action much more difficult. Officials feared severe protests and possible violence if they took such a course. Therefore, the administration sought to negotiate with the landowners and councillors. However, it used the possibility of forest appropriation as a strong bargaining ploy.

The council appointed a subcommittee in 1936 to meet with local elders, who pledged to protect the forest. When clearing continued over the next year, the district commissioner pressed for Forest Department management. Fearing government land grabbing, two councillors who were senior chiefs asked for a one-day adjournment in a 1937 meeting to consult with the lineage heads. Although government appointees, both men were well-respected as leaders and arbitrators. Neither chief was from the area under contention. Thus, they were viewed by lineage elders as third parties. The next day the chiefs announced that the lineages agreed to relinquish control of the forest, provided that it be placed under the council's jurisdiction and that the elders be involved in drawing its boundaries. British official agreed to the compromise. Local chiefs were assigned responsibility for preventing further encroachment.

Deforestation continued for the next two years, however, and British officials again pressured the councillors to permit Forest Department supervision. They emphasized the council would retain trusteeship of the forest. At one point the council's forest subcommittee agreed to the arrangement, but it was rebuked by the general council, which remained skeptical of government motives regarding land. Several councillors eventually proposed that the council itself assume management of the forest, setting up rules and mechanisms for control. The provincial commissioner's approval was needed before this plan could be implemented. He accepted the plan in 1940, but only if the foresters assumed control in the case of failure. Some councillors were angered by this condition, but the compromise passed.

The council's system of forest management combined customary rights with bureaucratic administration. Certain forest uses were restricted, such as clearing and cultivation. Permits for timber cutting were issued by the council's forest subcommittee, which was also responsible for walking around Njukiine's perimeter twice a year. District residents enjoyed customary rights to collect forest products and hang beehives. Outsiders who refused to be ritually accepted into a local lineage were excluded. Local families were hired to serve as guards. Administrative and council reports showed that forestry clearing largely halted by 1941.

4.1.3. Renegotiation

Despite the new managerial arrangement's clear success, British administrators reopened negotiations. Beginning in 1946, British officials again proposed that Njukiine be turned over to the foresters, a request rejected several times over the next few years. But the council and the department started working together in the late 1940s on establishing commercial forest plantations. Officials used the joint venture as leverage to have the council codify its by-laws and to designate Njukiine as a reserve in 1951, making it difficult to convert the land to non-forestry uses. In the midst of the Mau Mau War in the 1950s, the administration pressed the council, to turn over full management of Njukiine. A politically-neutered council in 1959 accepted the plan. By independence in 1963, much of Njukiine had been converted into a vast plantation forest.

The Kirinyaga County Council, the post-independence successor to the local native council, twice tried to renegotiate its agreement. In the mid-1960s it explored the possibility of again assuming direct control of its trustee forests, including Njukiine. A department representative argued that the council would lose considerable money if it abandoned the arrangement. Still, a subcommittee recommended doing so, but the full council voted against it. During the early 1980s, councillors approached the national government with an offer of exchanging Njukiine for a similar size parcel in the Mount Kenya reserve. They wanted to set up a revenue tea farm, but the proposal was rejected.

4.1.4. Analysis

Njukiine's history underscores the dynamic nature of forest conflicts and the often protracted nature of the disputing process. Some tensions were always present, thus the need in precolonial times for regulated use of the forest. Colonialism gradually set in motion, however, dramatic changes, which erupted in the 1930s: Gikuyu immigrants, lineage elders, local authorities, and colonial administrators all competed to control the use of the forest. A range of actors were involved as different disputes unfolded. Ironically, and quite tellingly, women - the most numerous of the major forest users groups - were absent in the disputing process. Several means were used to address the disputes: local moots, rituals, tribunals, chiefs, and administrative bodies. Negotiation was used in diverse settings: villager against villager in local moots; and African councillors against British administrators in the local council. Mediation, arbitration, and adjudication were also used at varying times by villagers, councillors, and British administrators.

Power differences clearly mattered. Sometimes quickly, sometimes slowly, less powerful actors disappeared from the arena of contention: initially the immigrant Gikuyu, then the elders; the council held its own for nearly two decades, but in the end the Forest Department's vision of resource management prevailed. Attempts by the Kirinyaga County Council to renegotiate with the national government have been rebuffed. It bears emphasizing, however, that the negotiation between the council and colonial government yielded for 12 years a very clear "win-win" solution of community forestry management. However, the proponents of commercial forestry development eventually exerted their will.

4.2. Articulating Local Knowledge In State Structures: The Cree of Quebec

In Quebec Cree and other northern Canadian native communities, forestry conflicts often center around wildlife harvesting and management. Disputes over forest resources have intensified in recent years due to population growth, competition between native and nonnative hunters, and the impacts of hydroelectric projects, forestry, and mining. One response of Cree communities has been to strengthen and in some cases modify indigenous resource management systems, which include mechanisms for dispute resolution. There has also been a wider attempt to incorporate such local systems into state structures for resource management.

4.2.1. Cultural Values and Traditional Resource Management

The "traditional" Cree resource management system (which has emerged from three centuries of fur trade involvement as well as ongoing subsistence activities) is based on family hunting groups and territories. Recognized hunting leaders or "tallymen" hold decision-making rights and obligations for individual family territories or "traplines." These includes the right to invite or exclude others from using the trapline, as well as setting quotas for harvests and controlling specific activities such as goose hunting.

Tallymen rely on kinship ties, reciprocity and personal influence to control activities on their traplines. While the position of tallyman is largely hereditary, respect and 'legitimate" authority is gained only through a proven ability to.manage and share the resources of one's trapline, and to "create cooperation as opposed to conflict" (Feit 1991:253). Tallymen act "as intermediaries in a complex chain of unequal social reciprocities," (1991:238) and because of this play a critical role in managing conflicts related to resource use on their own traplines and, increasingly, throughout the region.

Historically, a tallyman's actions in a dispute would generally be limited to the realm of social intercourse, either as a disputant or as mediator or arbitrator for others. As Cree communities value ideals like cooperation, respect and social harmony, few disputes reached the stage of open confrontation. Most were resolved through informal negotiation, or simply by indicating (often indirectly) one's knowledge of and displeasure with someone else's actions. In cases where stronger measures were needed, the tallymen usually had sufficient authority to decide what actions were needed and to take them. This is often the case even today, although tallymen frequently complain that their status has been eroded by social changes. In at least one community this has led to local action designed to bolster their authority, in the form of an official band resolution recognizing the "fundamental role of the Tallymen as protectors of the land and the rulers of the traplines" (The [Creel] Nation, October 7, 1994).

4.2.2. Formalizing Local Systems of Conflict Resolution

As the scope of forest conflicts expanded due to increased pressure on resources and access to them, more formalized mechanisms were needed to manage such disputes. In the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), a negotiated out-of-court settlement, the formal institutions were established to deal with conflicts over wildlife and other forest resources at various levels. As one example, the Cree Trappers Association was established "to assist in solving all problems affecting the welfare of the Cree trappers of Quebec," and is often responsible for moderating disputes between trappers, especially when they are from different communities.

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, and subsequent land claims settlements, are innovative attempts to control conflicts over land use and resources by delineating the rights and obligations of various parties and incorporating local needs and perspectives into state-level decision-making processes. The JBNQA recognizes the authority of traditional resource managers within Cree communities, while extending Cree influence over regional resource development. On paper at least, the JBNQA changed the Crees "from being complete outsiders to the resource decision-making process, to being co-equals with government resource managers in a formalized institutional structure" (Berkes 1989:191). While it has flaws and limitations, the Agreement has shown that it is possible to develop structures which respect local systems of resource management and dispute resolution while responding to changing social, economic, and political circumstances.

4.2.3. Regional Models for Collaborative Conflict Resolution

Similarities exist between Cree and other northern Native communities which suggest that certain models for handling forestry and other resource conflicts may be applicable beyond their local or regional bases. There is also evidence that elements common to indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, such as an emphasis on negotiation and consensus building, can be applied to a wider stage, including intergovernmental conflicts. One example of this is co-management committees, where Native (or local) and non-Native (or state) representatives work together to find solutions to complex resource management problems. In Quebec such an entity, called the Hunting, Fishing and Trapping Coordinating Committee (HFTCC), was established by the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.

According to Feit (1989), the HFTCC has had some success in resolving conflicts between parties with different resource use interests by providing a forum for information sharing and cooperative decision-making. At the same time, the committee has been plagued by problems ranging from government inaction to burdensome procedures, and "is still often treated as a body that is consulted only casually and after major policy decisions have been made" (1989:83). Other examples of co-management bodies in northern Canada, such as the Caribou Management Board, appear to be rather more successful in achieving their goals (Osherenko 1988). This may be due to having clearly defined goals (protecting a specific population of animals), plus ethnic compositions more conducive to Native input and control over decisions.

4.3. Government Intervention vs. Community Interaction: Indonesia and India

The growing field of alternative dispute resolution offers considerable potential for responding to infra-community, inter-community, and community-state conflicts (see Pendzich et al. 1994). Transferring ideas from one of these settings to another, however, requires a great deal of caution, including risk assessment beforehand to determine suitability. The following examples illustrate some of the issues that arise when investigating or applying dispute resolution mechanisms at the local level.

4.3.1. Environmental Mediation in Indonesia

Moore and Santosa's (1995) recent study of environmental mediation in Indonesia offers insights into some of the problems of trying to transfer indigenous conflict-resolution techniques. The case is particularly compelling because it shows that even when the political will exists to incorporate community-oriented mediation into public policy, officials do not necessarily know how to do this effectively. Their study also reveals the need for such technology to be based on an accurate understanding of local systems and practices.

As mentioned earlier, Indonesia has a legal tradition involving collaborative negotiation, adjudication, and mediation. Government officials promoted the adoption of mediation in environmental disputes as a culturally appropriate strategy. Several cultural and structural problems emerged, however, including "unfamiliarity of potential parties with a formal structured mediation process as a means to resolve disputes, and failure to recognize the similarity between this process and that of musyawarah [a form of traditional mediation]" (Moore and Santosa 1995:27-28).

The authors note that, ironically, the government had previously discredited and downplayed village-based dispute systems in favor of governmental administrative or judicial decisions. Officials had also originally defined environmental mediation "as something totally new and different from traditional processes" (1995:28). While seminars were eventually set up to explain similarities between traditional and contemporary practices, it appeared from the study that officials still failed to grasp the significance of the different contexts of community-based and government-run mediation systems.

Alternative conflict management has enormous potential in community forestry in Indonesia, and is likely to become a key element in the training of forestry and other environment-related professionals. Many communities will find, too, that its techniques have much relevance for them. Yet, much caution and patience are needed. The field will not benefit from being oversold, a sort of wonder tree on a supposed denuded landscape of dispute resolution. Before considering interventions, there is a need for outsiders to assess what already exists, and how well it seems to work.

4.3.2. Joint Forest Management in India

In contrast to the top-down approach to dispute resolution in the Indonesian example, the spread of cooperative forest-management committees in Orissa, West Bengal, and other parts of India, offers powerful evidence regarding the importance of felt needs and demonstration effects (Poffenberger 1994). The forest protection committees give villagers an institutional setting for carrying out resource management based on their needs and knowledge. Many of the committees began as local self-help efforts, with leaders responding to severe degradation of nearby sal (Shores robusta) forests. Community members set limits on local forest use, while setting up patrols to protect against outside encroachment. Often without official sanction, the committees exercised authority over selected forest patches. Encroachers were driven off or fined. Their efforts were repaid by the gradual regeneration of the forests.

This small-scale success served as a catalyst for other villages, which witnessed the transformation of the degraded woodlands, to try forest protection committees. In northern Orissa, for example, a single community in the early 1980s began a forest protection committee. With encouragement from sympathetic forest officers, a community leader initiated meetings with other villages. Through this exchange of information, the number of villages with forest protection committees rapidly increased in the region, from eight in 1987 to 79 by 1993 (Poffenberger 1994).

The communities soon organized themselves into an apex body, the Budhikhamari Joint Protection Party, to coordinate their efforts. The party also acts as an unified interest group in dealings with the forest department, timber companies, and fuelwood contractors. The committees have resisted being incorporated into local administration, preferring to maintain their autonomy.

Experience in India and Nepal suggests that the size of local forest management organizations is a crucial variable, with groups composed of 10 to 50 households most effective in carrying out activities, as well as settling internal disputes (Poffenberger 1994:73). Linkages to apex organization can also contribute substantially to the success and sustainability of grassroots groups. Apex organizations offer benefits, including external linkages, support in preventing the capture of local organizations by elites, and mechanisms for resolving disputes.

5. CONCLUSIONS

For community forestry workers and others engaged in projects that affect local people, there is obvious value to understanding and formally recognizing the role that local institutions and mechanisms play in conflict resolution. We must also recognize, however, that adaptability to changing circumstances and a willingness to incorporate new ideas is a hallmark of indigenous knowledge systems. We therefore prefer to view indigenous knowledge as a repertoire of ideas and techniques which individuals and communities draw upon when resolving problems, including forest and other resource conflicts. A key aspect of this conflict management "toolbox" is the flexibility that its users have when faced with a particular situation. For this reason, any attempt to codify indigenous responses to conflict may lead to even greater problems, as local people find themselves restricted in the methods for dispute resolution that are available to them.

The limited published material on the topic suggests that local people faced with community forestry conflicts use the same mechanisms available to them for other land use and resource conflicts. These include (but are not limited to) various forms of negotiation, mediation, arbitration and adjudication. The patterns that individual disputants follow in seeking satisfactory resolution of their disputes depend on a variety of factors, including personal knowledge, past experiences, available resources; their status or rights within (or outside) their community, and so on. A similar range of options exists for communities engaged in conflicts with other communities or with state or private entities.

Several examples in the literature show that there is potential for incorporating indigenous knowledge into innovative structures and mechanisms for the resolution and management of resource-related conflicts. Co-management of wildlife in Canada and joint forest management in South Asia are just two examples of how local needs and perspectives can be built into structures for resource management that transcend local-state jurisdictional boundaries. At the same time, there is considerable potential for state co-option of local knowledge and practices, for example by creating a nominal but ineffective joint management body which tends to undermine local traditional resource management systems.

There also may be dangers when introducing to a community "alternative" dispute resolution mechanisms, or successful ones from other communities, without fully understanding the local social, economic and political circumstances. Models for dispute resolution based on consensus and collaboration may appear universally relevant, but they do not guarantee equitable outcomes, especially where there are imbalances of status and influence. Nader (1995) points out that local power differentials are often overlooked or downplayed by those seeking to convince others of the virtues of collaborative models for dispute resolution.

In the long run, better methods of dispute resolution, like better farming techniques, will prove themselves. Providing information about alternative methods, and evidence of their utility and success, may convince communities embroiled in long-standing conflicts to adopt new approaches. One way for dispute resolution techniques to spread is through increased communication among different communities, and between local communities and the state or other outside actors. Face-to-face discussions and, if possible, immersion in each other's way of life, are likely to foster useful dialogues and realistic evaluations.

Finally, we believe there are risks in studying and codifying indigenous conflict resolution systems. By suggesting that a particular form of dispute resolution is most "appropriate" for a given community, we may actually affect the balance of power in that community by weakening the position of those who reject that structure. In a community where men traditionally control dispute resolution processes, for example, women may wish to have access to venues which better protect their individual rights. For them, external courts and other "non-indigenous" mechanisms may actually offer a better chance for an equitable decision. One cannot assume that all forms of conflict resolution based on local or indigenous knowledge are (1) based on achieving consensus, (2) fair and equitable, (3) supported by all community members with equal enthusiasm, or (4) capable of promoting sustainable resource management.

This does not mean that there is nothing to be gained from studying local systems of conflict management and dispute resolution. We suggest only that such a process is complex and requires a sophisticated analysis, including a thorough understanding of local historical, economic, social and political contexts, so that one does not reach mistaken conclusions which could actually have a harmful effect on the community. Conflict, by its nature, holds some risk for those involved, and any research or practice related to conflict resolution must be framed with a thorough understanding of these risks. Well-intentioned efforts to find or support "culturally appropriate" methods of conflict resolution for a community, even if there is strong evidence of past or present use, may do more harm than good.

5.1. Questions for Further Discussion

5.1.1. In cases where local dispute resolution systems tend to favor one social group, how could more equitable forms of dispute resolution be introduced while preserving the indigenous knowledge and cultural values of the community?

5.1.2. What are appropriate mechanisms for resolving conflicts where more than one set of knowledge or values applies, for example in disputes between state forestry managers and rural communities?

5.1.3. What ethical guidelines exist for mediators, arbitrators and adjudicators dealing with community forestry disputes?

5.1.4. How can local communities be empowered with respect to conflict management? Would greater communication between communities foster the development of more appropriate and effective local conflict resolution mechanisms?

5.1.5 Can local dispute resolution mechanisms be used to prevent or lessen modem day natural resource conflicts? How can traditional knowledge systems be used to anticipate conflict or to plan the management of forest resources in a collaborative manner?

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